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ISTARTED TO THINK specifically about Narcissus when I came 
across Christopher Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism.' The book 
seemed such an attack on the few social gains made by feminism. 
Yet Narcissus was a boy! What seemed particularly unjust was the 
description of the young executive as "the happy hooker." (The 
word Yuppie had not yet come into the common language.) Pros- 
titutes, however, were already organizing precisely because their 
class-position was rather different from that of young executives.2 
I turned to Freud and found that he too had located the richest 
examples of narcissism among women, especially women unfulfilled 
by the secondary narcissism of motherhood. Where was Echo, the 
woman in Narcissus's story? My essay is an attempt to "give woman" 
to Echo, to deconstruct her out of traditional and deconstructive 
representation and (non)representation, however imperfectly. 
There is a curious moment, peculiarly susceptible to racist misuse, 
in Freud's "On Narcissism: An Introduction": "We have learned 
that libidinal instinctual inferences undergo the vicissitudes of path- 
ogenic repression if they come into conflict with the subject's cultural 
and ethical ideas. . . . What he projects before him as his ideal is 
the Ersatz of the lost narcissism of his childhood, in which he was 
his own ideal. . . . The ego ideal . . . has a social side; it is also 
the common ideal of a family, a class or a nation."3 It is certainly 
at least implied here that the felicitous emergence of the superego 
happens because there is something other than mere conflict between 
cultural and ethical ideas and the libidinal instinctual inferences. 
The full-blown version of this particular theme-of non-European 
cultures being stuck in varieties of narcissism and its vicissitudes-- 
is not uncommon. Asia and Africa are always supposed to have had 
trouble with Oedipus. (Very broadly and irreverently speaking, if- 
as a man-you can't get to Oedipus, you are stuck with Narcissus. 
Women can't pass through Oedipus, and therefore the secondary 
narcissism of attachment to the (boy)child saves them from them- 
selves, from penis-envy and so forth.) Their growth is arrested on 
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the civilizational scale. Hegel trumped Freud in this in his plotting 
of the itinerary of the Spirit in Art.4 In the case of India, which 
in a certain way I "know" best, Sudhir Kakar, the eminent psycho- 
analyst, has diagnosed the Indian male type to be arrested in the 
moment of Narcissus.5 V. S. Naipaul, a diasporic Indian visiting 
India for the first ime in 1962, fell on this diagnosis with a vengeance. 
Although he has put down his earlier overreaction against India to 
his own ancestral Indo-Caribbean past in his new book, this particular 
definitive view seems unchanged; "underdeveloped ego" in the first 
book, infantile golden-agism in the second. These are the two 
moments: Narcissus and the ego ideal.6 Thus you might say that I 
am interested in the psychoanalytic Narcissus because, in a kind of 
"colonial" reconstellation of the matter of "Greece," he is made to 
stand at the door of the free discourse of Oedipus. 
I have always felt uneasy about the use of psychoanalysis in cultural 
critique since it is so culture-specific in its provenance. Like many 
others, I too have felt that Marxism, focusing on something on a 
much higher level of abstraction than the machinery, production, 
and performance of the mental theater, and as obviously global as 
capitalism, is not open to this particular charge. (To say capitalism 
is all over the place is not as universalist as to say everyone has the 
same-pattern psyche.) Although I feel the weight of Derrida's critique 
of institutional psychoanalysis in the world, especially in such deeply 
ambivalent questions as psychiatric care for the Union Carbide 
victims in Bhopal, since I am not qualified to speak of psychoanalysis 
as clinical practice, I must leave it largely alone.7 
For the use of feminist psychoanalysis in understanding sexual 
difference and gendering I feel some sympathy because it is so 
actively contestatory. But general cultural critique has always seemed 
to me to be quite another matter. Without the risks or responsibilities 
of transference, at least implicitly diagnostic and taxonomic, ignoring 
geopolitical and historical detail in the interest of making group 
behavior intelligible, and not accountable to any method of verifi- 
cation, the brilliance of psychoanalytic cultural criticism has always 
left me a bit suspicious. 
Yet Freud has remained one of my flawed heroes, an intimate 
enemy. To his race, class, and gender-specificity I would apply the 
words I wrote about Charlotte Bronte more than a decade ago: "If 
even minimally successful, my reading should incite a degree of 
rage against the gendered/imperialist narrativization of history, that 
it should produce so abject a script for him."8 
Both Freud and Marx move me in their engagement with ethics. 
Freud thought he had revised Kant, the representative ethical phi- 
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losopher of the Enlightenment.9 In spite of all Freud's claims, it is 
his vulnerability as a moral philosopher that is for me a lesson of 
history. 
It was finally my contact with the ethical philosopher Bimal Krishna 
Matilal that allowed me to make room for Freud in my intellectual 
world. Professor Matilal argued that nineteenth-century Indologists 
were basically correct in estimating that India had no tradition of 
moral philosophy in the Western European sense.'0 But they had 
not been able to grasp either the Indic tradition of rational critique 
or the tradition of practical ethics in India. According to Matilal, 
the latter was based on the reading of narrative instantiations of 
ethical problems. We read some of the Mahabharata together in this 
way. I realized that this way of doing rather than exclusively talking 
about doing (the other is also an ethical decision, of course-this 
is at the root of my unease with the use of psychoanalysis in cultural 
critique) ethics was a rather widespread, rather global, phenomenon, 
not confined to non-European cultures. It had been ranked as 
"popular" by most high-cultural European-model moral philosoph- 
ical systems. (I am not speaking, of course, of diagnosing story lines 
as formal allegories, drawing morals from parables, or attention to 
the "moral dimension" of fiction.) Jon Elster's Ulysses and the Sirens, 
which I was reading at the time, seemed an example of moral 
philosophizing on that "popular" model." And psychoanalysis, as 
a challenge to systematic moral philosophy, had certainly read re- 
ceived narratives and the sequentially constructed narratives of 
analysands as instantiations of socioethical problems. As a cultural 
critic rather than a clinical practitioner, I was not obliged to take 
the conclusions as scientific system. As a being in ethics, I could 
share them as malleable situational lessons. 
Professor Matilal also suggested that the moral dilemma was the 
most important terrain for the exercise of this type of practical 
ethics as encountered in the Indic tradition. Freud's recognition of 
the aporia between terminable and interminable analyses, and Der- 
rida's thinking of ethics as the experience of the impossible, resonated 
with this suggestion."2 Derrida's work is also a critique of traditional 
European systematic moral philosophy, after all. Further, this par- 
ticular privileging of the aporia in the field of ethical decision seemed 
quite apposite to the tale of Narcissus. As I will attempt to show 
in my reading of Ovid, it is a tale of the aporia between self- 
knowledge and knowledge for others. 
In this matter of knowledge for others I also received an impetus 
of interest from my discussions with Bimal Matilal. He discussed 
an argument advanced by Gangesa, a twelfth-century linguist, that 
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the production of truth was not necessarily dependent upon the 
speaker's intention. (This is bhrantapratarakavakya, the case of the 
deluded deceiver, who speaks the truth while thinking to lie.)'" I 
felt that Ovid himself, against his probable intentions, had monu- 
mentalized in neglected Echo the random possibility of the emer- 
gence of an occasional truth of a kind.'" 
Freud's "On Narcissism," written on the threshold of The Meta- 
psychological Papers, is philosophically bold. The desire of psycho- 
analysis is to tap the illogic that produces the subject's logic, and 
also the logic of the subject's illogic. Thus at the opening of the 
essay, Freud quietly asserts that at the origin "of the hypothesis of 
separate ego- and sexual-drives" (N 79) there is no grounding unity 
but only a riddle, the grounding riddle or Grundrditsel of biology. 
Unlike the Sphinx's riddling question to Oedipus, which for Hegel 
signifies the turn to Europe, "it is as idle to dispute" this absence 
of ground "as to affirm it" (N 79).15 The theory of the separation 
of the ego and sexual drives, as necessary to psychoanalysis as is 
the separation of Mind and Knowledge to Hegel, arises simply out 
of the fact that "it is a necessary hypothesis that a unity comparable 
to the ego cannot be available [vorhanden] to the individual from 
the start" (N 76-77). This acknowledgement of risk, the revelation 
of the ground of the cure as a necessary methodological presup- 
position, is the Freud of the dilemma who resonates with all my 
predilections for the dilemma as the type case of the ethical situation, 
that I have outlined in the opening pages of this essay. (If there is 
an objection to seeing the analyst's behavior as a species of ethical 
behavior-doing the right thing for the other person in light of 
the best knowledge available-then this resonance will fail.) How 
then does he interrupt the risk with the claim to science? "I am of 
the opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative 
theory and a science built upon the interpretation of the empirical. 
The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having a smooth, 
logically unassailable foundation [Fundamentierung] ... . The fun- 
dament [Fundament] of science . . . is observation alone" (N 77). 
It is a nice reversal of received ideas: speculation is logically firm; 
science is logically ungrounded but has an observational foundation. 
It will not surprise us that the science is anthropology and the 
observation fieldwork: speculation about "the mental life of primitive 
peoples," which then allows him to draw conclusions about "the 
mental life of children," although in the sentence describing the 
nature of these observations he conflates the two groups of people, 
as though primitive peoples were childless (N 75). In fact, if the 
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analogy between primitive peoples and children were not scientific, 
the fundament of the science would be blown away. I am obliged 
to notice that the ground of the differentiation between the spec- 
ulative and the scientific is becoming rather shaky here as well. We 
are told not to try to grapple with the grounding biological riddle 
of sexual difference as providing a basis for a theory arguing the 
ego's initial separation from sexual drives because it would be as 
ridiculous as attempting to prove inheritance by arguing from the 
kinship of all races. Does not the childlike behavior of primitive 
peoples belong to the same order of argument? In fact, is it not, 
in a certain way, exactly the opposite of arguments about the 
universal kinship of races? If the other term of the analogy brings 
the activities of the analyst practicing terminable analysis into the 
same workaday register as the settlement of legal disputes, then the 
entire justification of the scientificity of the diagnosis of narcissism 
is dubious. 
What does Freud observe, when he tells us that "this extension 
of the libido theory receives reinforcement from our observations 
and views [speculations?] on the mental life of children and primitive 
peoples" (N 75)? "In the latter," he continues, "we find characteristics 
which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania. 
In the children of today, whose development is much more opaque 
[undurchsichtbar] to us . . ." (N 75) Why are the characteristics of 
remote primitive peoples transparent to "us"? So that they can offer 
a basis for the firm foundation of science? And why do "we expect 
to find an exactly analogous attitude" (N 75) in the children of 
today? Is this not the same sort of desire for a methodological 
certainty which had been sternly put in its place earlier? Once the 
analogy is "found," or rather the declaration of its expectation is 
offered as its finding, the primitive peoples are not heard of again. 
I am of course not complaining that Freud is not sufficiently 
scientific. I have already said that it is the Freud who acknowledges 
dilemmas with whom I am in sympathy. I am remarking that the 
scientific basis that Freud needs is deeply marked by a rather 
offensive sort of casual racism for which there is certainly no 
precedent in the authoritative staging of the Narcissus narrative in 
Ovid. Freud was a man of considerable classical education and a 
sensitive reader. One might even invent a curious connection between 
Ovid's stated project in the Metamorphoses and Freud's stated project 
in the narcissism essays. Freud: I am "replacing the special chemical 
substances [of the organic soil (Boden) of the psyche] by special 
psychical forces" (N 78). And Ovid's Metamorphoses begins: "My mind 
is bent to tell of bodies changed into new forms."'" 
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Yet Freud leaves Ovid alone. In fact, Ovid's Narcissus, at first 
sight, seems to suffer from Freud's version of secondary narcissism. 
In one Freudian articulation at least, primary narcissism is an 
"absolute self-sufficien[cy] from which we step, toward noticing a 
changeful world outside and the beginnings of finding objects, by 
being born [mit dem Geborenwerden]."'7 Here the mother is nothing 
but, in Luce Irigaray's word, an "envelope."'8 By contrast, in Ovid 
Liriopes's womb has a history. It comes to envelop Narcissus by a 
primary rape by Cephisus, demidivine violence as sexual violence 
that does not offend the political economy of the gods. The entire 
pretext of Tiresias and Echo as major players is crosshatched by a 
story of punishment and reward. When Freud and Lacan use the 
narratives as psychoethical instantiations they ignore this framing. 
(It may be argued that Lacan dispenses with the story lines of 
Oedipus and Narcissus.'9 But Lacan is not a monolithic proper 
name. I cannot now spend time on the various turns in Lacan's 
career, nor on the connection between proper names and the psy- 
choanalytic institution. Here suffice it to say that the idea of the 
Mirror Stage, Lacan's reinscription of Narcissus, was launched in 
1936. And in the 1949 version Oedipus is present without quali- 
fication; and the end of psychoanalysis is a rewriting of Narcissus's 
iste ego sum (I am that) into an ec-static "Thou art that." For Lacan, 
it is in this that "is revealed to [the patient] the cipher of his mortal 
destiny.""20 I will argue that it is Ovid's Narcissus who is an icon of 
mortiferous self-knowledge.) 
Lacan's mirror-stage baby assumes his "specular image" jubilantly, 
thus "exhibit[ing] in an exemplary situation" -exactly as narratives 
instantiate active ethical structures--the "primordial form . . . [that] 
situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a 
fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the 
individual alone."21 Freud's secondary Narcissus is unenlightened. 
How different this modern Narcissus--plotted (in both the early 
Lacan and Christopher Lasch) in terms of a rather banal contrast 
between group ("social") and individual ("fictional") or, in an ad- 
mittedly subtler form in Freud, of an irreducible secondariness 
which alone gives a clue to the primary fiction, again a methodological 
underived fiction-from Ovid's Narcissus, emerging from a scene 
of responsibility and punishment.22 
As Freud and Lacan use an approximation of the Narcissus 
narrative for ethical instantiation, they ignore its framing. Indeed, 
as I look into the mass of learned literature on both the Narcissus 
tradition and narcissism, not only do I notice a singular absence of 
independent attention to the narrativization of Echo (the Renaissance 
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practice of Echolalia has rather little to do with the rhetorical 
philosopheme called Echo), but also an ignoring of the frame.23 I 
myself, although attentive to the frame, had not noticed Echo's part 
in it ten years ago. Here is what I wrote: 
The Narcissus story in Ovid is introduced by other accounts of sexual 
difference and divine violence. It unfolds while on earth a child torn from 
its mother's womb-because the mortal Semele could not withstand her 
lover Jove's heavenly glory, a sight she craved by Juno's vengeful temp- 
tation-gestates in the Father's thigh, God appropriating woman's power. 
In the preamble of the Narcissus story as such stands Tiresias. He too 
names a site where sexual difference is suspended. To become woman was 
his initial punishment for disturbing the copulation of holy serpents. Re- 
taining the memory of maleness he had realized that being-woman was a 
punishment. He had repeated his offense deliberately-an act of self- 
knowledge which will find its parallel in Narcissus-and won back maleness: 
a transformation-punishment that is thus also the fulfillment ofhis desire. 
Now he retains the memory of having-been-woman. He gives the opinion 
that women have greater sexual pleasure, an opinion contradicted by 
Narcissus' fulfillment and Echo's perpetual lack that we encounter in the 
embedded story. Juno punishes him with blindness, Jupiter compensates 
with clairvoyance.24 
Ten years later, Echo's figuration became clear. She too had served 
Jupiter. As he played with nymphs, she would engage Juno in 
prudent chat. It is this beguiling prudence that Juno takes from 
her: you can no longer speak for yourself. Talkative girl, you can 
only give back, you are the respondent as such. Jupiter does not 
give her anything in return. 
It is within this asymmetrical frame of transgression, punishment, 
and dubious reward that the Narcissus story is framed. The story 
of Narcissus is a tale of the construction of the self as object of 
knowledge. I will suggest below that the account of Echo is a story 
of a punishment that is finally a dubious reward quite outside of 
the borders of the self. 
The story of Narcissus is framed, then, in the value-coding or 
gendering of affect in a spectacular dynamics of transgression and 
reward. For Narcissus himself, we remember Tiresias's famous line: 
He will live as long as he does not know himself. He can instantiate, 
in the kind of reading I am proposing, the construction of the self 
as an object of knowledge. (It is perhaps in the recognition of this 
mortiferous autoerotic model of self-knowledge that Rousseau made 
Narcisse the artist.) 
There is a moment of exquisite anguish before the boy can describe 
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his predicament: et placet, et video; sed quod videoque placetque, / non 
tamen invenio (M 154, 11. 446-47) (It pleases, and I see it; but I 
cannot reach what I see and what pleases). In his description, it is 
clearly knowledge of the division in identity that kills and inscribes 
him in nature. He points and declares, iste ego sum: "I am that. 
... I now know my image.... I have what I desire. Strange prayer 
for a lover, I would that what I love were absent. .... Death is not 
serious for me for in death I will leave my sorrow" (M 156, 11. 463- 
71). 
It should be noticed that sum in Narcissus's declaration is gram- 
matically precarious in this declaration, yet possible. When Freud 
topologizes the psyche, it is the impossibility of self-knowledge as 
such that is captured in wo Es war soil Ich werden (where it was, I 
shall become). Narcissus's formula might run: Wo Es ist, bin Ich 
(nicht) (where it is, I am [not]); the limit of the possibility of self- 
knowledge. In Freud's ethical reading of narratives however, this 
relationship cannot be established. Freud's reading is no different 
from the magisterial Christian reading of Paradise Lost.25 And there- 
fore we remain accustomed to interpreting the declaration of the 
Ovidian Narcissus as a psychic problem. Attending to the frame 
and the text, I am obliged to say: if this is pathogenic repression 
what is on the other side is family romance. And Ovid's Narcissus, 
unlike Freud's, is not incapable of wishing for his own death. 
Insofar as I am culturally banished from Oedipus, I relate the 
narcissian proposition to another type of ethical instantiation in a 
narrative moment. Here is the utterance of Mary Oraon, in "The 
Hunt" by Mahasweta Devi.26 Mary is the girl-child of rape, of an 
Indian tribal by a colonial Englishman; as Narcissus is the boy-child 
of divine rape. Mary is the emblem of the subaltern postcolonial. 
"My mother should have killed me when I was born," says she. 
"And then, what about you?" asks another. "I would not have been," 
she answers. 
This is the moment of Narcissus: If I make disappear what I 
cannot not desire, I disappear too. But this is only one end of the 
shuttle. We move now to Echo. 
Echo in Ovid is staged as the instrument of the possibility of a 
truth not dependent upon intention, a reward uncoupled from, 
indeed set free from, the recipient. Throughout the reported ex- 
change between Narcissus and Echo, she behaves according to her 
punishment and gives back the end of each statement. Ovid "quotes" 
her, except when Narcissus asks, Quid . . . me fugis (Why do you 
fly from me [M 150, 11. 383-84])? Caught in the discrepancy between 
second person interrogative (fugis) and the imperative (fugi), Ovid 
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cannot allow her to be, even Echo, so that Narcissus, flying from 
her, could have made of the ethical structure of response a fulfilled 
antiphone. He reports her speech in the name of Narcissus: quot 
dixit, verba recepit (M 150, 1. 384)-he receives back the words he 
says. The discrepancy is effaced in the discrepancy of translation. 
In English, Echo could have echoed "Fly from me" and remained 
echo.27 
Narcissus is punished with the knowledge of the relationship 
between death and self-knowledge because he had not responded 
to the desire of others. But this punishment is not in the name of 
Echo. Here too Echo, by definition dependent, remains uncoupled 
from the effect of herself as cause. It is another youth of indeter- 
minate sex who brings Nemesis down upon Narcissus. You scorn 
us, know yourself. Child of rape, know as your Mother knows- 
for Tiresias's answer about the consequences of Narcissus's self- 
knowledge had been given to Liriope-you disappear if you act on 
your knowledge. 
Echo is dead in the narrative before this happens. And in her 
brief exchange with Narcissus, she marks the withheld possibility 
of a truth outside intention. 
Is there a radical counterfactual future anterior, where Echo, 
against her intention, a poor thing at best, will forever have exercised 
the negative transference ("fly from me" between question and order) 
that will have short-circuited the punishment of mortiferous self- 
knowledge? Is that the impossible experience of identity as wound? 
The a-venir of a history not written? But this can only be the radical 
interruption of ethical hope, which must be cut down to logical size 
so a calculus can be proposed. Let us look at Echo's death. 
In an interruption of narrative time, Echo comes to echo farewell, 
to echo the rites of mourning. 
At the moment of Narcissus's death, his sisters come to mourn 
him and in the place of the body find the flower. The body seems 
to have been inscribed into nature by sheer force of the agon of 
self-knowledge. The flower nods at the water here on earth to be 
the a-letheia (truth as unforgetting) of the limits of self-knowledge 
as Narcissus still gazes upon the waters of Lethe-though, unlike 
the Loeb translation, Ovid does not mention the image: in Stygia 
spectabat aqua (M 158, 1. 505, translated in the Loeb edition as "he 
kept on gazing on his image in the Stygian pool").28 
By contrast, Echo's echoing farewell comes from a space already 
insufficiently inscribed--an insufficiency that is the name not of the 
limits of self-knowledge but of the possibility of deconstruction. The 
rest of my essay will elaborate this theme. 
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At first there is nothing but voice and desiccated body. Finally 
there is nothing but voice, "for they say that her bones were turned 
to stone." Ovid uses a peculiar formulation: vox manet (M 152, 1. 
399). Received wisdom has it that it is scripta that manent. It is writing 
that remains. But in this singular space, voice remains, the body 
become stone. "The structural possibility of being severed from its 
referent or signified (and therefore from communication and its 
content) seems to me to make of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme 
in general, ... the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut 
off from its alleged 'production' or origin."'29 
Let us now consider this figuring of Echo in two related but 
different ways. First, how does it give us the offer of a precarious 
foothold outside of the subject-position of the "wild" psychoanalyst 
cultural critic, producing an irresponsible simulacrum of the analyst 
in her consulting-room? 
Just as Oedipus has to be male, Echo has to be female. (Narcissus 
as figured can go both ways and, as we have seen, in the banalized 
psychic-problematic interpretation, has been most often located in 
the female.) Echo is female-figured because the asymmetry of the 
reward-punishment compensation circuit between herself and Ti- 
resias is equalized, still asymmetrically, from the moment of the 
impossibility of echoing as punishment between the Latin interrog- 
ative and imperative forms of "fly from me," the two subject-positions 
named Narcissus and Echo in the exchange, where someone called 
Ovid (the analysand? the cultural critic? the received storyteller as 
writer? us?) has to take a role and fill in with "what happened" 
which is never exactly "what happened" marked with a difference, 
here the difference between question and response, questioner and 
respondent. Guarding this difference is Echo's punishment turned 
into reward, a deconstructive lever for future users. We remember 
that even if Echo had been able to echo and act according to mere 
punishment with no difference of subject-position, the response 
would have been a refusal to answer or (we cannot be sure) a 
suggestion that this particular respondent is inappropriate. Thus: 
N. Why do you fly from me? E. Fly from me--I cannot answer you 
or I am not your proper respondent: a deferment independent of, 
indeed the opposite of, the sender's intention. A difference and a 
deferment together are, strictly speaking-but can one be strict 
about this?--diffirance. 
Here is the figuration of Echo's "reward." Her punishment fails 
(in order) to mark diffkrance. Ovid covers it over with telling; we 
open it."3 
It is this mode of utterance that is covered over in Ovid's report 
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that Echo says "fly from me [?]." In the rest of the narrative, through 
the representation of a stable-yet-unstable, same-yet-different non- 
originary voice that remains, an unintentional vehicle of a possible 
cure--the figured though separated accompaniment of a successful 
mortiferous self-knowledge that cannot advance-is glimpsed, a cure 
that is one possible case among many. 
For Echo is obliged to echo everyone who speaks. Her desire and 
performance are dispersed into absolute chance rather than an 
obstinate choice, as in the case of Narcissus. If the ever-renewed 
narcissus flower is a "natural monument" to the fulfillment of 
Narcissus's desire-as-punishment out of this world, the lithography 
of Echo's bony remains merely points to the risk of response. It 
has no identity proper to itself. It is obliged to be imperfectly and 
interceptively responsive to another's desire, if only for the self- 
separation of speech. It is the catachresis of response as such. 
Echo's mourning is outside the opposition of mourning and a 
melancholia only half of which is narcissism. She is inscribed as 
destinerrance as such. She gives the lie even to Derrida's absent 
interlocutrice, whom Derrida echoes and corrects (reaching for 
Narcissus and Ovid in one) in The Post Card: "P.S. I forgot, you 
are quite right: one of the paradoxes of destination, is that if you 
wanted to demonstrate, xpressly for someone, that something never 
arrives at its destination, it's no use. The demonstration, once it has 
reached its end, will have proved what one should not demonstrate. 
But this is why, dear friend, I always say 'a letter can always not 
arrive at its destination, etc.' "31 
In my ethically instantiated reading of the Ovidian narrative, the 
traces of Echo occupy the position of something like an analyst. 
Under the broken rebus-legendary bones and paradoxically per- 
sistent absent voice, connected by nothing at all-that is her mark 
or guarantee that she will be around, the mastership of truth 
(Derrida's critique of the Lacanian analyst), is the experience of the 
impossible (Derrida's description of ethics).32 Echo will not have 
been dragged into the circuit of political imitations. 
And now the second question: What ethical instantiation does this 
figuration of Echo offer "us"-the worldwide collectivity of con- 
scientized feminists of color from bourgeois origins or in passive 
capitalist social relations? We must catch the undoing moment of 
Echo as she attends, at a distance, every act of cultural narcissism. 
This feminist is culturally divided from the women at the bottom. 
I have already indicated that what she sees as her face she knows 
to be an "it" which she loves and of which she desires the disap- 
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pearance, which is the precarious moment of the Ovidian Narcissus; 
in order not to speak for, speak to, listen to, but respond to the 
subaltern sister. In the current conjuncture, national identity debates 
in the South and "liberal" multiculturalism in the North want her 
to engage in restricted-definition arcissism as well. Simply put: 
love-your-own-face, love-your-own-culture, remain-fixated-in-cul- 
tural-difference, simulate what is really pathogenic repression in the 
form of questioning the European universalist superego. 
If this position can raise a "why do you fly from me?" toward 
the subaltern separated from the feminist, then the feminist might, 
just might, ventriloquize the "fly from me" toward that Narcissus- 
face, both the self-knowing Ovidian and the deluded Freudian. In 
fact, the subaltern herself is also sometimes caught in the desire 
for Narcissus and the "fly from me" gesture, on another level. Once 
there is an effort to engage in the politics of subalternity-on-the- 
move, who questions and who answers "fly from me" is not at all 
clear. The only thing we know is that "be like me, be my image" 
can never be on the agenda, from either side. I should also emphasize 
that this "imitation" cannot be the slow-motion thinking-through of 
a raised consciousness. In the field of decisions, it can only be the 
sort of much-practiced reflex that shows the steps in slow motion 
if anyone cares to analyze after the fact; and analysis, notoriously, 
is inadequate to its object. If, under such circumstances, the imitation 
of Echo takes us this far, we have to remember that Echo produces 
the possibility of a cure against the grain of her intention, and 
finally uncoupled from intention. Echo will not have been dragged 
into the circuit of adequate political imitation. The "practice of 
freedom," especially in the context of women divided into feminists 
and women, does not come simply because of the fact of gaining 
something called independence. 
In the context of the difference between Isma (colloquial Arabic 
for "she is called," with the proper name to be filled in, and thus, 
in this case, a blank), central character in Fantasia, a self-knowing 
woman (and therefore mortiferously aware of the limits of self- 
knowledge, caught in the moment of the Ovidian Narcissus) who 
has learned the practice of the writing of the hegemonic language 
and women in her so-called traditional culture, Assia Djebar has 
written something called "a-phonie," which I discuss below.33 
As an Algerian woman who has learned the practice of French 
writing, Assis Djebar is not-quite-not-Narcissus, with some doubt 
about claiming the historicophilosophical "I," for traditional women 
of her class will insist that she insert her "self" into a received 
orality-strictly speaking, a graph ("the stitched seam of arche- 
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writing, condition of the [so-called oral] language, and of writing 
in the narrow sense")34--as the only appropriate mode of expression 
for her, her "law of genre"35: 
Each gathering, weekly or monthly, carries over the web [tissu] of an 
impossible revolt. Each speaker [parleuse]--the one who clamors too high 
or the one who whispers too fast-is freed. The "I" of the first person will 
never be used: in stereotyped formulas the voice has deposited its burden 
of rancor and of rales rasping the throat. Each woman, flayed inside, is 
eased in the collective listening. And the same for gaiety, or happiness- 
which you must guess at; litotes, proverb, to the point of riddles or 
transmitted stories, all the verbal stagings are unrolled for unpicking fate, 
or exorcizing it, but never to strip it bare. (F 154-55) 
Over and against this chain of mere whispered souvenir that survives 
in the acknowledgement of the exclusion from the writing of classical 
Arabic she moves to French for a narrative memoire. Yet she cannot 
be the Rousseauistic Narcisse of French tradition either. She must 
make the other acknowledgement as well: that the French dictionary 
cannot grasp the rhetoric of the Algerian woman's body. The frag- 
mentary finale of Fantasia begins with two French dictionary entries 
that read a figure in that corporeal tropology in two opposed ways. 
One: tzarl-rit means "to utter cries of joy while smacking the lips 
(of women)."36 The other: tzarl-rit means to "shout, vociferate (of 
women when some misfortune befalls them).""37 Mourning or jubi- 
lation, Narcissus cannot know. 
Caught in this middle space, all she can insert, ambiguously, is 
a sheltering a-phonie, a concept-metaphor for which I find no literal 
referent: "All words, too lit-up, become braggadoccio, and aphonie, 
untamed [inentam--the history of the language will allow un- 
broached] resistance" (F 178). 
A-phonie, midway between women's oral culture and patriarchal 
scripture, is a willed imitation of Echo's warning-in-longing that 
must continue to fail, since one cannot Echo willingly. It is the 
impossibility in view of which the risk of legal battles like the fight 
for a uniform civil law must be undertaken. And if this is interpreted 
in terms of the mirror-stage narcissism of Enlightenment phallocracy, 
vox manet.38 
If I read the deconstructive embrace between Isma and Echo as 
an ethical instantiation, here then is what emerges: something re- 
lating to the need of a uniform civil code for men and women, not 
personal codes that keep women minors; something that would 
make it impossible for patterns of transgression and reward to be 
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asymmetrically gendered, in the calculus of the law. 
Negotiating without much choice with various structures inherited 
from colonialism, necessarily fighting to write the body in the nor- 
mative, privative, rational abstractions of a uniform civil law, rather 
than a culturally inherited and imperially consolidated personal code, 
the body "bereft of voice," is a stone (F 156). In this divided field, 
the recovery of a woman's voice is useless in autobiography and 
equally anthropologistic if it does not acknowledge that the woman- 
in-culture may be the site of internalized phallocracy. It is thus that, 
between writing in French and the culturally patriarchal woman's 
voice, Djebar gives to the supercolonized woman the task of a- 
phonie: not a writing, not a graph, but not the phonocentric re- 
sponsibility-rather-than-rights-based patriarchal-functionalist unme- 
diated woman's voice either. This may claim "identity" with the 
impossible dimension of the rhetoricity of Ovid's Echo: vox manet. 
In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" I wrote of Freud as a monitory 
model.39 In this essay as well, as I read narrative as guide to action 
and limits to action, Freud remains an ally, as class, race, and gender- 
bound, in his different ways, as no doubt am I. Assia Djebar's 
brilliant essay on the gaze in Delacroix can be included in this 
alliance.40 The deconstructive embrace that holds the elite texts 
reporting on the nineteenth-century subaltern and the subalternist 
historians is another example. The elite allies can serve as monitory 
models for the decolonizing feminist, but they-Ovid, Freud, Dela- 
croix, colonial elite-lose their lineaments in the process. They cannot 
serve when we try to learn--outside of the closed circuit of the 
production of academic knowledge-the impossible response to the 
gendered subaltern. In her own separate enclosure, the subaltern 
still cannot speak as the subject of a speech act. Dishing out our 
personal pain in academic bestsellers serves women on the make 
or catharsizing voyeurs. And Rigoberta Menchu, a spirited subaltern 
who has networked herself into the structure of hegemonic discourse, 
immediately becomes the object of right-wing critique. 
What follows is an extended appendix. Readings such as the above 
are read, if at all, with a certain "political piety," as a "third-world 
intervention" and then laid aside when the serious mainstream work 
of deconstruction is undertaken. I have therefore included the 
following three examples: 
I am in a deconstructive embrace with Claire Nouvet's "An Im- 
possible Response," which I read after completing the preceding 
pages.41 It is a brilliant and much more adroit example of the same 
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genre of reading. Our embrace is asymmetrical, as are all embraces. 
The asymmetry can be tabulated as a difference in stakes, which 
cannot not be reckoned (with) in ethical-instantiation readings. Her 
stake seems to be the figurality of the self. What my stake is the 
reader will decide. Within the warmth of an embrace, then, I reckon 
our asymmetry: 
In spite of her careful reading of Echo, Narcissus remains the 
hero of the predicament of the "self." He it is who, character or 
figure, with the help of Echo, figure or character, thematizes or 
figurates the impossibility signaled in Nouvet's title. 
In place of the "self," the Ovidian text, deconstructing itself, is 
invested with a certain sovereignty. Much of this sovereignty is 
established by allowing it to perform an undermining of "character" 
by "figure."42 I see this as a contemporary fading-away of the 
"polytheist" habit of mind of thinking being and principle in an 
agile slippage.43 One focus does not necessarily "undermine" or 
"correct" the other (although that power-claim is the substance of 
"polytheisms" as sites of conflict) in a "live polytheist" discourse. 
Who knows how a "Roman" thought a "Greek" story? I am not 
interested in a vulgar Heideggerian narrative of religion-in-ethics. 
But it does not seem necessary to censor the genealogical imagination 
either. 
Perhaps it is this imperative to keep Narcissus center stage that 
does not allow Nouvet to notice Echo as also in an anterior and 
asymmetrical frame of punishment and reward with Tiresias. There- 
fore she must inscribe Ovid's inability to let Echo be Echo as Narcissus 
unechoed (IR 121). Indeed, if the failure of echo between inter- 
rogative and imperative is finessed by Ovid in reported speech, 
Nouvet's text, replete with quotations, gives this "passage" (in every 
sense) as three pages of report. 
This stake in the "drama and story" of the "self" seems to limit 
the question of the feminine. Since the unbalanced parallel of Tiresias 
and Echo as male and female singularities is not seen, at a certain 
point in Nouvet's essay, Echo is simply seen as "the feminine" rather 
than "bad girl," "talkative girl," "girl of deluding tongue," as in Ovid. 
In a few pages of her essay, the "self" becomes genderless, until 
the resounding first person plural at the end of the essay operates 
simply in terms of being-human: 
Ovid's text opens a dangerous question: if a humanist self-assertion is
"criminal" [I should have trouble here because of the failure of the polytheist 
imagination, the confusion of self-recognition and self-knowledge (of this 
more later), and the meaning of "punishment"], can we ever hope to avoid 
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this crime? .... It is by definition "incomprehensible" since it revokes the 
very notion of a self. We therefore cannot pretend to comprehend it, but 
can only expose our "selves" to its questioning, a questioning which can 
only disturb the comfort of our "good conscience" by confronting us to the 
uncertain status of our "subjectivity," of our "selfhood," and even of our 
"humanity." (IR 133-34; emphases mine) 
Ethics are not a problem of knowledge but a call of relationship 
(without relationship, as limit case). But the problem and the call 
are in a deconstructive embrace: Narcissus and Echo. If we see 
ourselves only as subjects (or "selves") of a knowledge that cannot 
relate and see the "self" as writing, our unavoidable ethical decisions 
will be caught in the more empirical, less philosophical "night of 
non-knowledge,"44 a "decenter[ing] of the subject, as is easily said, 
without challenging anew the bond between, on the one hand, 
responsibility, and, on the other, freedom of subjective consciousness 
or purity of intentionality. ... a parade of irresponsibilizing de- 
struction, whose surest effect would be to leave everything as it is," 
and to flatten gender.45 
If we move to Echo as the (un)intending subject of ethics, we are 
allowed to understand the mysterious responsibility of ethics, that 
its subject cannot not comprehend.46 In fact, if in the curious protocol 
of a deconstructive embrace I transgress Nouvet's text by displacing 
the antecedent of "it" from "Ovid's text" to "Echo," the move is 
made. Yet this is not simply to make Echo say I am it now (nunc 
sum ego iste), for we are levering her out where Ovid's text signals 
its loss of sovereignty, that it cannot catch her as such, make her 
act Echo. 
Because she is obliged to give to Ovid's text this self-deconstructive 
sovereignty, Nouvet describes the Narcissus split as self-recognition 
rather than self-knowledge.47 It is, of course, not a question of right 
or wrong readings. Between different ethical-instantiation fields, the 
difference may be no more than between seeing the glass half-full 
rather than half-empty. For Nouvet the self-recognition is inscribed 
in negatively charged language, as a "problem" and a "decompo- 
sition" (IR 124, 125). For us, Narcissus's self-knowledge is an ac- 
cession to a clarity that is so clear that it will not lead to relation: 
to know that to know the self is to slip into visible silence: some 
call it writing. If Ovid and Freud are other readers/writers of a 
narrateme in a tradition of ethical performance, then "Ovid" (the 
reader function of the Narcissus story in Metamorphoses) is as much 
a text as his "text," and deconstruction is as much an experience 
of the impossible as it is a response to the impossible as an impossible 
response. 
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My stake in Echo will not allow me to ignore Freud's ignoring 
of Ovid's staging of (Narcissus and) Echo. Freud is part of the 
precomprehended scenario of "An Impossible Response," emerging 
via Blanchot's invocation of the primal scene as scene of writing.48 
An in-house reading, where the text is sovereign in its self-decon- 
struction, even as the "self" becomes (dis)figured. 
It is perhaps this that makes for the peculiar blind spot of the 
essay: the reading of Narcissus's death as a liquefaction (IR 125- 
28). It is indeed an "ambiguous" death, not because it is a liquefaction, 
but because it is a burning as well as a liquefaction. The two vehicles 
of the similes that describe Narcissus's demise are "yellow wax" and 
"hoar frost." How render both, as does Nouvet, to "water"? It is 
only if we remember the yellow flower and Narcissus in Styx that 
we can "understand" Echo as still "around." "Is there anyone 
around?" is not, strictly speaking, a question whose "response S 
. . inhabits the question" (IR 110). Its answer may inhabit the 
question, when Echo answers, by default. Vox manet, but only some- 
times as resident answers. 
Under the rebus of Echo then-since we are nowhere without a 
blind spot-I invite Nouvet to share mine. Rather than overlook 
the play of burning and melting, I "naturalize" in-fans (speech-less) 
into more than a pun with infancy, into a (historically and specifically) 
feminine infancy of speech (as ambiguous as liquefying through 
burning) that can no longer be written when self-knowledge inhabits 
the ambiguity of a "live autopsy," a contemporary rearticulation of 
Narcissus's desire for the death of the loved object: un parler d'enfance 
qui ne s'6crit plus (a speaking of infancy which can no longer be 
written), in an impossible response to which Djebar proposes a- 
phonie, not Narcissus's disaster but Echo's peculiar "reward": to "fail" 
to order flight from fixation with, in this case, a self that cannot 
accede to an "I," to an ego sum, to the iste ego sum of writing, which 
would itself have been unable to ask for that failed response except 
through the failure of self-knowledge, imagining that the shadow 
flies the shadower. I ask Claire Nouvet to attend to a-phonie, Echo's 
responsibility. This would allow her to escape the tedium of the 
Oedipal chain (here represented by Blanchot-Schlegel, one might 
have included Rousseau) reading Narcissus. Insert Echo as the 
unintending force field that teaches us "that the imperative quality 
of 'il faut' proceeds in fact from a relentless and demanding uncer- 
tainty" (IR 131-32). Echo the brothers in a self-knowledge that 
"kills." 
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One question remains: Can this narrative be read without the 
specific ethical burden of the feminist in decolonization? By defi- 
nition, ethical-instantiation readings must have different stakes, dif- 
ferent experiences of impossibility. I have already referred to Freud's 
mature reflection upon the impossibility of an adequately justified 
psychoanalysis. Keeping that aporia in view, I offer here the outlines 
of a reading from "a general psychoanalytic position," as if, beset 
by schools and subschools as the "science" is, such a thing were 
possible. I have chosen Andre Green's Narcissisme de vie, narcissisme 
de mort (Narcissism of Life, Narcissism of Death) simply because it 
is neither too conservative nor too current, innovative in one or 
two details without being aggressively original, and not yet in touch 
with feminism.49 
Green remains within the invariable telos: Narcissus marks an 
arrest where there should be a passageway to others or the Other. 
Given his stake in the telos within the forgotten ethical impossibility 
of psychoanalysis, I will show how his text too asks for supple- 
mentation by Echo. 
First, of course, Narcissus. Green has an intuition of the part of 
mortiferous self-knowledge; the part he calls "epistemophilia 
implying the erotization of the process of thought" (Nvnm 33). 
Green's contribution in this text is the suggestion of a positive and 
a negative narcissism, and epistemophilia is the negative. But without 
Echo, the death generated by positive narcissism lacks the dignity 
of the Ovidian narrative: "for shame, the only way open is that of 
negative narcissism. A neutralization of affects is at work, a mor- 
tiferous enterprise where the work of a Sisyphus operates. I love 
no one. I love only myself. I love myself. I do not love. I no. I O. 
Same series for hatred. I hate no one. I hate only myself. I hate 
myself. I no. I O. This series of propositions illustrates the evolution 
towards the affirmation of the megalomaniac I as the last step before 
disappearance" (Nvnm 207).5o 
Yet Echo struggles to break through the argument. Here is the 
description of the psychic apparatus, admittedly the boldest Freudian 
breakthrough: "It is logical to admit that the effect of structuration 
[condition and effect of the apparatus] must come from elsewhere if 
the Self is thus engaged in the instantaneousness of the present" 
(Nvnm 93; emphasis mine). Narcissus immobile, Echo from 
elsewhere. 
In an uncanny description of the project of psychoanalytic thought, 
Green writes, ostensibly about narcissism: "Narcissism is the efface- 
ment of the trace of the Other in the Desire of the One" (Nvnm 
127). We see the effacement at work when, considering negative 
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narcissism in a woman, Green faithfully emphasizes her penultimate 
declaration, "My mind is blank and I can't think," but ignores her final 
remark: "Since I cannot work, I telephone someone" (Nvnm 157). 
"Tele-phone," distant-voice, vox manet, an effort at domesticating 
Echo; but she will not yield to imitation, to the apparatus that would 
harness the distant voice to matching questions and answers. 
"Echo" in lower case gives us a clue to her foreclosure. When 
Green proposes a complex of the dead mother, he says, in passing, 
"in fact, the complaint against X was really against a mother absorbed 
perhaps by something else, and unreachable without echo, but always 
sad" (Nvnm 235). Echo's dispersal into the common language has 
not only foreclosed her narrative, but reversed and scrambled the 
narrative: an unreachable desired mother of the homosexual son. 
Speaking of the treatment of moral narcissists, Green writes, "To 
the extent that it [transference] remains expressed by way of the 
words of the analyst in terms of objects, it has little echo on this 
material covered over by the narcissistic carapace" (Nvnm 201). Again, 
a longing for Echo, lost in the history of the language, not facing 
the terrifying ethical possibility that Echo/Transference might be as 
"absurd" as Narcissus/Self-representation (Nvnm 139). 
Our reading proposes a shifting of the stakes. For us Narcissus 
is not necessarily a stalling of/in the self where there should be a 
passageway to others or the Other. There is access to the founding 
dilemma of ethics if we read the Narcissus-Echo pair as an icon (or, 
more accurately, a graph) of the passage, crossed easily and im- 
perfectly in the exchange of everyday life, and authoritatively in 
the production of theory on all levels of civil and military enterprise. 
Then at "ground" level, where justification is sought and offered, 
we see the knowledge of the self as writing, stalled; and the symbolic 
circuit not as a relatively fixed Eurocentric scenario, but a contentless, 
enclitic, monstrative vector, its definitive responsive character unfilled 
with the subject's intention, though the intentional moment (Echo's 
speech toward Narcissus) is not absent.51 Who can deny that, in the 
construction of the subject's history, the driving force of the symbolic 
is a desire for self-knowledge, although full self-knowledge would 
mean an end to symbolicity? Why, in spite of so many hard lessons 
to the contrary-not the least from the vicissitudes of many cultural 
and gender-inscriptions-do we still cling to the rotarian episte- 
mology of advancing from the Imaginary to the Symbolic?52 
The plausibility of this reading is marked by Echo's struggle for 
emergence in the text. She will be found in the text, even as she 
marked the moment of textual transgression in Ovid. 
One re-forming entailed by this intervention is to make the self 
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"writing" and "male"-and to make the Symbolic "feminine." Will 
this change a historical habit? I can hope. 
I am in another sort of deconstructive embrace with my old 
graduate school friend Samuel Weber, both of us students of the 
predeconstructive Paul de Man, excited early by Derrida's work, 
untroubled by changes in critical fashion, in our own different ways 
attempting to carve out political trajectories within what we know 
and learn. It is no surprise to me that in his Legend of Freud, Weber 
does not give sovereignty to the self-deconstructive "text" (here 
Freud) but produces a new reading from where it transgresses itself 
in terms of its own protocols.53 In doing so, Weber produces a 
reading of psychoanalysis where narcissism is not a stage to be 
superseded, but rather plays a constitutive and operative role. I give 
below a summary of Weber's remarkable rewriting of the Freudian 
enterprise, and end, again, by rescuing Echo, struggling to break 
through. 
Weber sees "speculation," reflection in the mirror or speculum, 
as itself narcissistic, and sees the project of the adequation of the 
self and of thought as an unwitting description of the narcissistic 
predicament. He provides a brilliant summary of scholarship in 
support of his contention that both French and Anglo-American 
Freudians "have shared the conviction that Freud articulated the 
death drive as an alternative, or even antidote, to the power exercised 
over his thought by the theory of narcissism" (LF 124). Although 
he is, I believe, somewhat unjust to Lacan here, he also suggests 
that in Freud, as opposed to what we find in Lacan, the scene is 
not one of progression from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, but 
"that there is an other scene of the Symbolic, of the Fort-Da game, 
and it is precisely: the Imaginary, in all of its aggressive, narcissistic 
ambivalence" (LF 97).54 It is unjust to Ovid too, of course. The 
acknowledgement of the mortiferous quality of the self as writing 
is inscribed in Ovid's narrativization; and Narcissus longs for death. 
I resonate, nonetheless, with Weber when he suggests that Freud's 
thought would develop according to the paradigm of a dynamic 
disunity of which narcissism is the organized, if ambiguous, part. 
"[W]hat is at stake here is the possibility of elaborating and rethinking 
what Deleuze has called the 'transcendental' nature of speculation 
in terms of a certain notion of narcissism, one that is never fully 
explicated in the writings of Freud, but which is all the more 
powerfully at work in his texts because it remains, in part at least, 
implicit .... The power of narcissism then, would entail not simply 
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the symptom of an individual subject, 'Freud': but rather the the- 
oretical project of psychoanalysis itself, putting its limits into play" 
(LF 128, 125-26, 125). 
"The power of narcissism." Where does it come from? The last 
words Echo gives back to Narcissus, to his emoriar, quam sit tibi copia 
nostri (M 150, 1. 391)-translated in the Loeb edition as "May I die 
before I give you power o'er me!"-are sit tibi copia nostri! (I give 
you power over me). Copia nostri s "our plenty, our plenitude," but 
also "the provisions that we have laid up for the future," even "our 
forces," as in military forces, the same metaphor as in Besetzung, 
lost both in "cathexis" and investissement. Following the powerful 
tricks of Ovid's text, Narcissus's ambivalence toward death here- 
"May I die," nothing more than a rhetorical exclamation-is turned 
into truth independent of intention (explicit-implicit in Weber's text, 
bhrantapratarakavakya in Gangesa), even as Echo bequeathes her 
reserves to him by way of an "imperfect" repetition.55 
Let us step out of the psychoanalytic enclosure for a moment 
here and repeat that, in terms of a feminism as such (whatever that 
might be), sit tibi copia nostri s a variation on the old game of playing 
female power within the male establishment. The Narcissus-Echo 
relationship is more complex. The homeopathic double bind of 
feminism in decolonization, seeking in the new state to cure the 
poison of patriarchy with the poison of the legacy of colonialism, 
can read it as an instantiation of an ethical dilemma: choice in no 
choice, attendant upon particular articulations of narcissism, ready 
to await the sounds to which she may give back her own words. 
Back in Weber's text, let us now trace Echo's struggle to step 
forth. I believe her lineaments in the following passage are clear 
enough for me not to have to retrace them at this stage. Indeed, 
the mortiferous Narcissus and Echo as devious voice are indistin- 
guishably imbricated here: "the very Stummheit (muteness) of the 
death drive precludes it from ever speaking for itself; it is inevitably 
dependent on another discourse to be seen or heard. And that 
discourse, however much it may seek to efface itself before the 
"silence" it seeks to articulate, is anything but innocent or neutral. 
The death drive may be dumb, but its articulation in a theoretical 
and speculative [or risky activist; see my previous paragraph (GCS)] 
discourse is not" (LF 129). 
It is in the following passage that I find it disturbing that Echo 
still remains foreclosed. Weber is describing Freud's imprisonment 
within the discourse of the same, even as he gropes for radical 
difference: 
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[I]f Freud's initial stories deal with men, betrayal, and ingratitude, death 
enters the scene with-as?-the passive female. . . . The Schicksalzug (trait 
of destiny) that Freud asserts it represents, is ... a recurrent fatality linked 
to the female: she either eliminates the male or is eliminated by him. But 
nothing is more difficult to do away with than this persistent female: you 
kill her once, and her soul returns, "imprisoned in a tree"; you "slash with 
(your) sword at (the) tall tree," and a voice comes to accuse you. The activity 
of the subject, in this final story, consists indeed of a repetition, but what 
he repeats, actively, is the narcissistic wound that never heals without leaving 
scars. (LF 134) 
Freud's story comes from Torquato Tasso's Gerusalemme Liberata 
(1576), a text that is itself among the European reinscriptions of 
Ovid. If he had paid as much attention to Ovid, the "persistent 
female" might have come to undo the Freudian Narcissus. In the 
event, I agree with Weber that "[f]or Freud ... the stories he has 
told are not versions of the narrative of narcissism, but evidence 
of something radically different. And yet, when he seeks to describe 
that difference, it emerges as more of the same" (LF 135). 
"The two sources of psychoanalytic concepts are psychoanalytic 
practice on the one hand, and the epistemological horizon on the 
other" (Nvnm 32). Good words, with which psychoanalysts of any 
school would find it hard to disagree. I have spoken only of the 
latter. Psychoanalytic practice, being a species of performative ethics 
within the calculus of professional exchange, must suit its terms to 
every analytic situation. An essay such as this one must remain 
scrupulously parasitic to that space, rather than claim it for an 
irresponsibilizing cultural diagnosis. 
Let's step off in closing, beyond "humanity" and short of it, where 
Ovid and Freud are flashes of species-being in the great ecosystem 
of species-life. Narcissus is fixed, but Echo can disseminate. Whales, 
those paleo-mammals that were once creatures of the earth, echo- 
locate objects and other inhabitants in the sea world, which is not 
their home but merely their makeshift dwelling place. The interior 
of the body, inside Narcissus's carapace, can give us back echoes 
that hi-tech can intercept to by-pass the "Self." Ava Gerber's stunning 
"body art" can be an example of an impossible imitation of Echo, 
attending to the failed narcissism of United States body culture. 
Wallace Stevens's "beauty is immortal in the flesh"'56 celebrates every 
change in the flesh as beauty, down to its inscription in the economy 
(Haushaltung) of nature after what the Biblical Elders would decipher 
as decay and death. James Joyce is another flash in the system, 
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6 See V. S. Naipaul, India: A Wounded Civilization (New York, 1973), pp. 107-23; 
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tr. Robert Dewsnap et al. (Lund, 1967). (Professor Georgia Nugent has pointed out 
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different from the Ovidian narrative. An ethical-instantiation reading focuses on a 
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Epistre d'Orth&a s "anyone who asks for help in great need" (see Vinge, The Narcissus 
Theme, pp. 94, 101). I have no doubt that an extended look at these texts with a 
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in Pastoral, Epic, and the Jonsonian Masque (New Haven, 1984) is a more theoretical 
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narrativizations, "as the myth of cultural memory" (p. 5). His Echo is caught between 
"the genius of myth, of sorts" and the "phenomenology of acoustical reflection itself" 
(pp. 10, 9). When he speaks of ethics, he is analyzing the structuring of stories 
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ethical responsibility (p. 132). To be sure, the predicament of the self-conscious 
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25 For the definitive discussion of this passage, see John Brenkman, "Narcissus in 
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barrassment of successful response here, as opposed to the ethically more useful bit 
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voicer). The ethical-instantiation reader must choose between a gendered agency 
that can speak its desire within gendering, where the narrator reports her (internalized 
constraint as a version of) fulfilled choice, or a gendered aporia that goes beyond 
mere (historically contaminated) intention. For our part, a greater responsibility 
beckons in the instantiation of the possibility that history is in all respects larger 
than personal goodwill. 
28 The reader will notice that I too have played a translator's trick here, substituted 
the Greek Lethe for the Latin Styx. Latin does not have an exact equivalent of aletheia 
for truth (thereby hangs Heidegger). 
29 Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan 
Bass (Chicago, 1982), p. 318. 
30 For the importance of reported speech in the Law of Genre, we must elaborate 
a position from Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, tr. Ladislav Matejka 
and I. R. Titunik (New York, 1973), p. 115 ff. I have attempted to do this in the 
context of multiracial representation as well (unpublished colloquium, Congress of 
South African Writers, Cape Town, 15 Aug. 1992). 
31 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond, tr. Alan Bass 
(Chicago, 1987), p. 123 (translation slightly modified). Cited in Jacques Derrida, 
"Pour l'amour de Lacan," in Natalia S. Avtonomova et al., Lacan avec les philosophes 
(Paris, 1991), pp. 416-17. 
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also "The Force of Law," p. 981 and passim. 
33 Assia Djebar, Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade, tr. Dorothy S. Blair (New York, 
1985); hereafter cited in text as F. 
34 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, 
1976), p. 175. 
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Savoir absolu to Sa (the third person singular genitive with an unspecified female 
object), Djebar keeps the autobiographical culture-divided female subject's name a 
blank by the ruse of proper naming. (Sa is everywhere in Derrida, Glas, tr. John P. 
Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand [Lincoln, Nebr., 1986]. For the placing of the "L," 
see p. 261b.) 
36 See the listing under tzarl-rit, in Dictionnaire pratique arabe-franfais, ed. Marcelin 
Beaussier (1871; rpt. Algiers, 1958); quoted in F, p. 221 (my emphasis). 
37 See the listing under tzarl-rit, in Dictionnaire arabe-franfais, ed. Albert de Biberstein- 
Kazimirski (Paris, 1860); quoted in F, p. 221 (my emphasis). 
38 In the context of a traditional culture that is fully oral, I would like to refer 
here to the African National Congress Women's Charter of 1954 (see Raymond 
Suttner and Jeremy Cronin, 30 Years of the Freedom Charter [Johannesburg, 1986], 
pp. 162-64). 
39 See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana, 1988), 
p. 296-97. 
40 Assia Djebar, "Forbidden Gaze, Severed Sound," in her Women of Algiers in Their 
Apartment, tr. Marjolijn de Jager (Charlottesville, Va., 1992). 
41 Claire Nouvet, "An Impossible Response: The Disaster of Narcissus," Yale French 
Studies, 79 (1991), 103-34; hereafter cited in text as IR. I am grateful to Dorothea 
von Mticke for bringing this essay to my attention. 
42 IR, p. 111. Yet on the next page, Nouvet makes a peculiarly characterological 
move by assigning to Narcissus one, rather than another, phenomenal affect-fear 
rather than pride-and constructs a new reading on it. As the next sentence of my 
text will suggest, such a slippage is good "polytheist" practice, and problematic only 
if one sees character and figure in opposition. 
43 I have commented on the "monotheist" habit of the imagining of the subject 
of the ethical decision in a number of texts; most accessibly in my "Not Virgin 
Enough ... ," in my Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York, forthcoming) and 
in Matilal and Spivak, Epic and Ethic. 
44 Derrida, "The Force of Law," p. 967. 
45 Jacques Derrida, "Mochlos or the Conflict of the Faculties," tr. Richard Rand 
and Amy Wygant, in Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties Today (Lincoln, Nebr., 
1992); the French original of this quotation is to be found in Jacques Derrida, Du 
droit a la philosophie (Paris, 1990), pp. 408, 424. 
46 Incidentally, this shift is reflected in Derrida's move from "reticen[ce]" because 
the ethical "presupposes ... the self" (Jacques Derrida and Pierre-Jean Labarriere, 
Altgrit6s [Paris, 1986], p. 76; cited in IR, p. 103) to ethics as "the experience of the 
impossible" ("The Force of Law," p. 981, emphasis mine); that this move is particularly 
significant for Derrida is indicated by the fact that in the latter Derrida is citing an 
earlier piece by himself. 
47 Is this because of Lacan's unseen presence? "Two factors emerge from this 
preliminary delineation of the Imaginary-the factor of aggression, rivalry, the image 
as alienating on the one hand, and the more structurally oriented notion of a 
fundamental mis-recognition as the foundation of subjectivity, with the image as 
salutary fiction, on the other" (Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision, p. 175). The 
difference between the subject's history and mythic story being that in myth it is a 
"knowledge" rather than a misrecognition, and the fiction is not "salutary" in a 
curative sense. Oedipus does sleep with his mother, he does not just want to. 
48 See Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, tr. Ann Smock (Lincoln, Nebr., 
1986), p. 125 ff.; cited in IR, p. 128 ff. 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Fri, 13 Mar 2015 19:03:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ECHO 43 
49 See Andre Green, Narcissisme de vie, narcissisme de mort (Paris, 1983); hereafter 
cited in text as Nvnm (my translations). 
50 Luce Irigaray will undo this in her brilliant Je, tu, nous: Pour une culture de la 
diff6rence (Paris, 1990), forthcoming in English (New York). 
51 Incidentally, this would enrich and dislocate Lacan's geometry of the gaze in 
interesting ways. 
52 The best reading within this epistemology is Juliet Mitchell's (although I am 
not sure why she writes that "Narcissus never believed that what he saw in the 
pond's mirror was himself"): "the mirror did not give him himself, because the only 
one in the world he had to tell him where he was, was Echo, the absolute other, to 
whom none could get attached because she would not listen [why?] and who did 
no more than repeat the words of Narcissus's own self-fascination. But no one could 
have done any more; for Narcissus is confined in intra-subjectivity" (Juliet Mitchell, 
Psychoanalysis and Feminism [Harmondsworth, 1975], pp. 38, 39). 
53 Samuel Weber, The Legend of Freud (Minneapolis, 1982); hereafter cited in text 
as LF. 
54 As Jacqueline Rose has pointed out, in the mature Lacan the Imaginary slides 
into the Symbolic, primary into secondary narcissism. A single sentence will have to 
suffice here: "Hence, the symbolic equation that we rediscover between these objects 
arises from an alternating mechanism of expulsion and introjection, of projection 
and absorption, that is to say from an imaginary interplay" (Jacques Lacan, "The 
Topic of the Imaginary," in The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book 1, Freud's Papers on 
Technique 1953-54, tr. John Forrester [New York, 1988], p. 82; emphasis mine). This 
is still, of course, a continuist simplification of Freud's discontinuous dynamics, what 
Weber calls "the play of speculation." I refer my reader to Freud's reverse definitions 
of speculation and science, quoted on page 20. 
55 
56 See Wallace Stevens, "Peter Quince at the Clavier," in The Collected Poems of 
Wallace Stevens (New York, 1982), p. 91. The lines of the poem read, "Beauty is 
momentary in the mind- / . . . But in the flesh it is immortal." 
57 James Joyce, Finnegans Wake (New York, 1939), p. 13. 
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